Safety and Reliability of Embedded Systems

(Sicherheit und Zuverlässigkeit eingebetteter Systeme)

Risk Acceptance Methods

Content

- Definition of risk

- Terminology overview

- Aim of risk acceptance

- Factors influencing risk acceptance

- Risk acceptance methods MEM, GAMAB, ALARP

- Aspects of functional safety

- Example: Risk graph according to DIN EN 61508

- Definition of **risk**: R = H * S
  - H: expected frequency of the occurrence of an event that leads to a particular harm
  - S: expected severity of the harm

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
- Frequency H can be quantified by probabilities or rates. Methods for finding or modeling harmful events (e.g., fault tree analysis) can be used to determine H

- Due to the potential variety in possible harms, the severity of a harm can often be quantified only on a very subjective basis. Financial loss, minor injuries, severe injuries or death can hardly be compared objectively!

- Therefore, comparisons of a given risk caused by a particular system with acceptable risk values are also subjective

Quelle: Rothfelder

Risk identification, assessment, and acceptance are important steps in dealing with risks. In the following, the focus will be on risk acceptance.

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              ┌──────────────────┐
              │   Risk analysis  │
              └──────────────────┘
                       │
                       ▼
              ┌──────────────────┐
              │ Risk identification
              │        and        │◄──────────────┐
              │   quantification  │               │
              └──────────────────┘               │
                 ╱           ╲                    │
                ▼             ▼                   │
      ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────────┐      │
      │  Frequency   │  │Severity estimation│     │
      │  estimation  │  │                  │      │
      └──────────────┘  └──────────────────┘      │
                ╲           ╱                      │
                 ▼         ▼                       │
              ┌──────────────────┐                │
              │  Risk evaluation │                │
              └──────────────────┘                │
                       │                          │
                       ▼                          │
                    ◇ Risk ◇        No   ┌──────────────────────┐
                  ◇ acceptable? ◇ ─────► │     Avoidance,       │
                    ◇      ◇              │ reduction, relocation│
                       │                 └──────────────────────┘
                      Yes
                       ▼
              ┌──────────────────┐
              │  Operation with  │
              │  residual risk   │
              └──────────────────┘
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
- The **aim of risk acceptance** is to bring about a decision in a systematic and founded fashion whether the risk under consideration can be accepted or not. In the latter case, the system causing the risk cannot be put operational

- In particular for **safety-critical systems**, admission offices follow such a procedure as a prerequisite for putting the system in operation (e.g., for railway transportation systems)

Risk Acceptance Goals

- The **costs for risk reduction** do not increase linearly with reducing residual risks. Merely, they are disproportionately high. Therefore, there exists an **economically optimal trade-off** between the costs of a system and its residual risks. This trade-off could be acceptable, but it can also be the case that the residual risks are still too high and further risk reduction is demanded

Cost benefit ratio

Legend:
- Cost of risk minimization
- Cost of risk
- Sum

Axes: Cost (vertical), Safety (horizontal)

Risk Acceptance Influencing Factors

- Deciding, which risks are acceptable, is also subjective and depends among other things on the following factors
  - **Degree of benefit?** Great distances in aviation: Is the exposure to this particular risk related to travel distance or time spent in the aircraft?
  - **Who is at risk?** Astronauts, sick persons, railway travelers, service personnel, uninvolved public
  - **Degree of self-determination?** – Driving a car vs. taking an elevator
  - **How many people are at risk?** – Car vs. nuclear power plant
  - **Severity?** Death or injuries?

Voluntary	High self-determination	Low self-determination	Unvoluntary

Marginal cost/SFr/Death

Explosive material fabrication (Arbeiter, 1991)
Mean road traffic accident (BfU, 1988)

Explosive meterial storage and fabrication (Drittperson,1991)
Nuclear power (England, 1993)

Railway tunnel (ÖBB, 1993)

Aviation (USA)
Railway tunnel (DB, 1982)

100 Mio

British Rail

10 Mio

Big Belt (Schiene, 1988)

1 Mio — Railroad crossing DB, 1986

Road traffic (USA)

0.1 Mio

Heteronomy

Risk Acceptance
Limits for Individual Risks Per Year vs. Heteronomy

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	Voluntary	High self-determination	Low self-determination	Unvoluntary

10^{-1}

10^{-2} — Drug consumption

10^{-3} — Gliding

10^{-4} — Car accident (driver)

10^{-5} — Car accident (co-driver) / Fire (small child)

Railway passenger

10^{-6}

Marginal value for individual risk per year

Heteronomy

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- Important risk acceptance methods
    - **MEM** (Minimal Endogenous Mortality)
    - **GAMAB** (Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon)
    - **ALARP** (As Low as Reasonably Practicable)

MEM - Minimal Endogenous Mortality

- The Minimal Endogenous Mortality method is based upon the fact that there exist different mortality rates in society, depending on age and gender. These deaths are partly caused by technical systems. MEM now compares the risks due to a new system with already existing risks caused by „natural" mortality. **MEM demands that the new system does not significantly contribute to the existing mortality caused by technical systems**

MEM - Minimal Endogenous Mortality

• Studies show the lowest mortality rate for 13 year-old healthy boys with a value of 2×10^{-4} deaths per person and year. For a new technical system, 10^{-5} deaths per person and year are considered a noteworthy contribution to this rate. This acceptance level is further reduced if the death toll of an accident increases

Risk/deaths per person and year

—— Minimum Endogenous Mortality

—— Acceptable individual risk

$\approx 1\,\text{fit}$

$= 10^{-9}\,h$

Extent of damage/number of deaths

MEM - Minimal Endogenous Mortality

- The MEM method can also be used in such cases, where the comparison between a novel system and similar pre-existing systems is not feasible

- However, within MEM, the underlying referenced time basis is left unclear. Do we look at a particular individual being exposed to a certain hazard or is it the public we actually mean?

- Moreover, it is questionable whether focusing on a single system is sufficient since we are constantly faced with numerous systems whose individual risks might accumulate

Risk Acceptance
Minimal Endogenous Mortality (MEM)

- According to MEM, the **collective risk of fatality**, RF_{total} , can be calculated from hazards $1, …, i$ in the following way:

$$RF_{total} = \sum_{hazard_j} A_i \cdot F_i \cdot \frac{N_{end,i}}{N_{all}} \cdot HR_i$$

HR_i	$[1/t]$	Rate, with which hazard i occurs
$S = A_i \cdot F_i$	$[1]$	Extent of damage (Cost of hazard)
A_i	$[1]$	Probability that hazard i will result in an accident (typically from event trees, fault trees)
$F_i = N_{end} \cdot P$	$[Persons]$	Probability P that death or injury is caused by an accident multiplied by the number of endangered persons
N_{end}	$[Persons]$	Number of the actually endangered persons in danger area of hazard i
N_{all}	$[Persons]$	Total number of system users

- This figure represents a value **intrinsic to the system** and is therefore independent of the time a particular person is exposed to the system

- The perceived **individual risk of fatality** IRF_i for a particular person i can be calculated from given hazards in the following way:

$$IRF_i = \sum_{hazard_j} NP_i \cdot \left[HR_j \cdot (D_j + E_{ij}) \cdot \sum_{accidents_k} A_{jk} \cdot F_{jk} \right]$$

NP_i $[1/t]$ Usage profile (number of usages per time)

HR_j $[1/t]$ Rate, with which hazard j occurs

D_j $[t]$ Duration of hazard j

E_{ij} $[t]$ Time during which individual i is exposed to hazard j

A_{jk} $[1]$ Probability that hazard j will result in accident k (typically from event trees, fault trees)

$F_{jk} = N_{end} \cdot P_k$ $[Persons]$ Probability P_k that death or injury is caused by accident k multiplied by the number of endangered persons

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Example: Rollercoaster

- Assumptions

Hazard		Rail breaks
No survivors	$C \cdot F$	= 1 dead person
You go for a ride once a year	NP	$= 1/a \approx 10^{-4} \text{ h}^{-1}$
A ride lasts 5 mins	E	= 0,08 h
Time of hazard	D	= 0,01 h

- Question: What is the maximal hazard rate HR that still satisfies MEM?

Example: Rollercoaster

- Solution
  - $IRF_i \quad = \quad 10^{-4}\ h^{-1} \cdot HR \cdot 0{,}09\ h \cdot 1 \quad << \quad 10^{-5}\ /\ a \approx 10^{-9}\ h^{-1}$
  - $HR \quad << \quad 1{,}11 \cdot 10^{-4}\ h^{-1} \quad \approx 1/a$

- Collective risk probably 50 dead persons per year => definitely not acceptable!

GAMAB – Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon

- Unlike MEM, GAMAB requires the **existence of a reference system** with accepted residual risks

- According to GAMAB, residual risks caused by a new system must not exceed those of the reference system

- In other words: More innovative solutions must not result in higher risks! (GAMAB: *Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon* = globally (overall) at least as good)

GAMAB – Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon

- In the application of the method, the word *globalement* (overall) plays an important role. It is tolerable to compensate the degradation of one residual risk by the improvement of another. What counts for at the end is the sum of the residual risks of the overall system

- Basically, GAMAB requires the determination of the residual risks of the system under consideration and their comparisons with the residual risks of the reference system

- This can be achieved by e.g. an explicit risk analysis (using fault trees for example). The system is acceptable if, all in all, it is not worse than the reference system (EN 50126)

ALARP – As Low as Reasonably Practicable

- ALARP aims to minimize risks under **consideration of economic and social aspects**. ALARP tries to assess what is technically feasible within the context of financial feasibility and acceptance in society

- The overall risk can fall into one of three possible ranges
  1. The risk is negligible and can be accepted without further measures
  2. The risk is higher than commonly accepted but falls below the upper limit of tolerability
  3. The risk is unacceptably high

Not acceptable

Cannot be accepted except in extraordinary circumstances

Upper limit of tolerability

Tolerable only if risk reduction is not feasible or if its cost is disproportionate to the improvement gained

Tolerable if cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement gained

Limit of commonly accepted risk

Risk negligible

Total risk is negligible. No further measures necessary

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
ALARP – As Low as Reasonably Practicable

- If the risk is irrelevant, ALARP does not demand any further measures

- If the risk is unacceptably high, measures to reduce this risk must be taken in either case
    - Correct categorization requires an assessment of the residual risks and a comparison with corresponding acceptance values
    - These acceptance values are specific to each sector and group of people
    - E.g. in the sector railway systems, higher residual risks are accepted for an employee than for the ordinary passenger
    - ALARP requires that the residual risk of a new system falls below it

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Safety

Systematic Faults
Accidental Failures

| Quality Management | Safety Management | Technical Safety | Quantitative Safety |

SIL 0	No safety requirements (Attention: EN 50128 poses the minimum safety requirement)
SIL 1	
SIL 2	
SIL 3	Appropriate methods and tools according to SIL
SIL 4	

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
- Within DIN EN 61508, the terms "safety integrity" and "safety integrity level" are defined

  - **Safety Integrity**

    "*probability of an E/E/PE* safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time*"

    (DIN EN 61508-4:2010)

  - **Safety Integrity Level (SIL)**

    "*discrete level (one out of a possible four) corresponding to a range of safety integrity values where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest*" (DIN EN 61508-4:2010)

    *Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic

Necessary minimal risk reduction	Safety integrity level
-	No safety requirements
a	No special safety requirements
b, c	1
d	2
e, f	3
g	4
h	An E/E/PE SRS* is not sufficient

* Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic safety-related system

C = Consequence (C_1: minor injury … C_4: great many people killed)

F = Frequency and exposure time (F_1: rare to more often, F_2: frequent to permanent)

P = Possibility of avoidance (P_1: possible under certain conditions, P_2: almost impossible)

W = Probability of unwanted occurrence (W_1: very slight probability, W_2: slight probability, W_3: relatively high probability)

Note: Risk graph concept used to be defined in DIN 19250, which has been withdrawn in favor of DIN EN 61508-5:2010

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Risk parameter	Classification
Consequence C	C_1: **Minor injury** C_2: **Serious permanent injury** to one or more persons; **death of one person** C_3: **Death of several people** C_4: **Great many people killed**
Frequency and time of exposure to the hazardous zone F	F_1: **Rare to more often** exposure to the hazardous zone F_2: **Frequent to permanent** exposure to the hazardous zone
Possibility of avoiding the hazardous event P	P_1: **Possible** under certain conditions P_2: **Almost impossible**
Probability of the unwanted occurrence W	W_1: A **very slight probability** that the unwanted occurrences will happen and **only a few unwanted occurrences** are likely W_2: A **slight probability** that the unwanted occurrences will happen and **few unwanted occurrences** are likely W_3: A **relatively high probability** that the unwanted occurrences will happen and **frequent unwanted occurrences** are likely

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